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Abstract
We consider an adversary looking to steal or
attack a black-box machine translation (MT)
system, either for financial gain or to ex-
ploit model errors. We first show that black-
box MT systems can be stolen by querying
them with monolingual sentences and training
models to imitate their outputs. Using sim-
ulated experiments, we demonstrate that MT
model stealing is possible even when imitation
models have different input data or architec-
tures than their victims. Applying these ideas,
we train imitation models that reach within
0.6 BLEU of three production MT systems
on both high-resource and low-resource lan-
guage pairs. We then leverage the similarity
of our imitation models to transfer adversar-
ial examples to the production systems. We
use gradient-based attacks that expose inputs
which lead to semantically-incorrect transla-
tions, dropped content, and vulgar model out-
puts. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we pro-
pose a defense that modifies translation out-
puts in order to misdirect the optimization of
imitation models. This defense degrades imi-
tation model BLEU and attack transfer rates at
some cost in BLEU and inference speed.
1 Introduction
NLP models deployed through APIs (e.g., Google
Translate) can be a lucrative asset for an organiza-
tion. These models are typically the result of a con-
siderable investment—up to millions of dollars—
into private data annotation and algorithmic im-
provements. Consequently, such models are kept
hidden behind black-box APIs to protect system
integrity and intellectual property.
We consider an adversary looking to steal or at-
tack a black-box machine translation (MT) system.
Stealing a production model allows an adversary
to avoid long-term API costs or to launch a com-
petitor service. Moreover, attacking an MT system
using adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014)
enables an adversary to expose egregious transla-
tions that harm system owners or users. In this
work, we investigate these two exploits: we first
steal (we use “steal” following Trame`r et al. 2016)
production systems by training imitation models
and then use these imitation models to generate
adversarial examples for production systems.
We create imitation models by borrowing ideas
from knowledge distillation (Hinton et al., 2014):
we query production MT systems with monolingual
sentences and train imitation (i.e., student) mod-
els to mimic the system outputs (top of Figure 1).
We first experiment with simulated studies which
demonstrate that MT models are easy to imitate
(Section 3). For example, imitation models closely
replicate victim outputs even when they are trained
using different model architectures or on out-of-
domain queries. Applying these ideas, we imitate
production systems from Google, Bing, and Sys-
tran with high fidelity on English→German and
Nepali→English. For example, Bing achieves 32.9
BLEU on WMT14 English→German and our imi-
tation achieves 32.4 BLEU.
We then demonstrate that our imitation models
aid adversarial attacks against production MT sys-
tems (Section 4). In particular, the similarity of
our imitation models and the production systems
allows for direct transfer of adversarial examples
obtained via gradient-based attacks. We find small
perturbations that cause targeted mistranslations
(e.g., bottom of Figure 1), nonsense inputs that pro-
duce malicious outputs, and universal phrases that
cause mistranslations or dropped content.
The reason we identify vulnerabilities in NLP
systems is to robustly patch them. To take steps to-
wards this, we create a defense that finds alternate
translations that cause the gradient of the imitation
model to point in the wrong direction (Section 5).
These alternate translations slightly hurt victim
BLEU, but they cause more significant declines
in imitation model BLEU and lower adversarial
example transfer rates.
2 How We Imitate MT Models
We have query access to the predictions (no prob-
abilities or logits) from a victim MT model. This
victim is a black-box: we are unaware of its in-
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Eq. (2)     Save me it’s over 100°F 
Phase One: Model Imitation
  German
     Hallo!
      Dank
        . . . .
        . . . .
Hello!
English
Monolingual
                              
API Parallel
 English
  Hello!
  Thanks
   . . . . 
   . . . . 
Hallo!
Imitation Model
English Encoder
German Decoder
English Encoder
German Decoder
Phase Two: Adversarial Attacks
Rette mich, es ist über 100°F    Rette mich, es ist über 22°C
       Save me it’s over 102°F 
English Encoder
German Decoder
Rette mich, es ist über 22°C
     Save me it’s over 102°F 
Figure 1: Imitating and attacking an English→German MT system. In phase one (model imitation), we first select
sentences from English monolingual corpora (e.g., Wikipedia), label them using the victim API, and then train an
imitation model on the resulting data. In phase two (adversarial attacks), we generate adversarial examples against
our imitation model and transfer them to the production systems. For example, we find an input perturbation that
causes Google to produce a factually incorrect translation, see the link here (all attacks work as of April 2020).
ternals, e.g., the model architecture, hyperparam-
eters, or training data. Our goal is to train an imi-
tation model (Orekondy et al., 2019) that achieves
comparable accuracy to this victim on held-out
data. Moreover, to enhance the transferability of
adversarial examples, the imitation model should
be functionally similar to the victim, i.e., similar
inputs translate to similar outputs.
Past Work on Distillation and Stealing This
problem setup is closely related to model distilla-
tion (Hinton et al., 2014): training a student model
to imitate the predictions of a teacher. Distillation
has widespread use in MT, including reducing
architecture size (Kim and Rush, 2016), creating
multilingual models (Tan et al., 2019), and improv-
ing non-autoregressive generation (Ghazvininejad
et al., 2019). Model stealing differs from distilla-
tion because the victim’s (i.e., teacher’s) training
data is unknown; this causes queries to typically be
out-of-domain for the victim. Moreover, because
the victim’s output probabilities are unavailable
for most APIs, imitation models cannot be trained
using distribution matching losses such as KL
divergence as is common in distillation.
Despite these challenges, prior work shows
that model stealing is possible for simple classi-
fication (Lowd and Meek, 2005; Trame`r et al.,
2016), vision (Orekondy et al., 2019), and language
tasks (Krishna et al., 2020; Pal et al., 2019). In par-
ticular, Pal et al. (2019) steal text classifiers and
Krishna et al. (2020) steal reading comprehension
and entailment models; we extend these results
to MT and investigate how model stealing works
for production systems. Moreover, unlike Krishna
et al. (2020) who show that transfer learning en-
ables model stealing, we show that effective MT
model stealing is possible without transfer learning.
Our Approach Accordingly, we assume access to
a corpus of monolingual sentences. We select sen-
tences from this corpus, query them to the victim,
and obtain the associated translation. We then train
an imitation model on the resulting “labeled” data.
3 Imitating Black-box MT Systems
We first study imitation models through simulated
experiments: we train victim models, query them
as if they are black boxes, and then train imitation
models to mimic the victim outputs. In Section 3.3,
we turn to imitating production systems.
3.1 Research Questions and Experiments
In practice, the adversary will not know the victim’s
model architecture or source dataset. We study the
effect of this with the following experiments:
• We use the same architecture, hyperparameters,
and the source data as the victim (All Same).
• We use the same architecture and hyperparam-
eters as the victim, but use an out-of-domain
Mismatch Data Test Inter OOD
Transformer Victim 1x 34.6 - 19.8
All Same 1x 34.4 69.7 19.9
Data Different 3x 33.9 67.7 19.3
Convolutional Imitator 1x 34.2 66.2 19.2
Data Different + Conv 3x 33.8 63.2 18.9
Convolutional Victim 1x 34.3 - 19.2
Transformer Imitator 1x 34.2 69.7 19.3
Table 1: Imitation models are highly similar to their
victims. We train imitation models that are different
from their victims in input data and/or architecture. We
test the models on IWSLT (Test) and news data from
WMT (OOD). We also measure functionality similarity
by reporting the BLEU score between the outputs of the
imitation and the victim models (Inter).
(OOD) source dataset (Data Different).
• We use a different architecture, either (1) the vic-
tim is a Transformer and the imitator is convolu-
tional (Convolutional Imitator) or (2) the victim
is convolutional and the imitator is a Transformer
(Transformer Imitator).
• We use different source data and a convolutional
imitation model with a Transformer victim (Data
Different + Conv).
Novelty of Our Work Past research on distilla-
tion shows that mismatched architectures are of
little concern. However, the impact of training on
OOD data, where the teacher may produce wildly
incorrect answers, is unknown.1
Datasets We use German→English using the
TED data from IWSLT 2014 (Cettolo et al., 2014).
We follow common practice for IWSLT and report
case-insensitive BLEU (Papineni et al., 2002). For
Data Different, we use English monolingual sen-
tences from Europarl v7. The predictions from the
victim model are generated using greedy decoding.
3.2 Closely Imitating Local Models
Test BLEU Score We first compare the imita-
tion models to their victims using in-domain test
BLEU. For all settings, imitation models closely
match their victims (Test column in Table 1). We
also evaluate the imitation models on OOD data to
test how well they generalize compared to their vic-
tims. We use the WMT14 test set (newstest 2014).
1Krishna et al. (2020) show that random gibberish queries
can provide some signal for training an imitation model. We
query high-quality OOD sentences.
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Figure 2: We first train a baseline model on the standard
IWSLT dataset (IWSLT, gold translations). We then
train a separate model that imitates the baseline model’s
predictions on the IWSLT training data (IWSLT, model
translations). This model trains faster than the base-
line, i.e., stolen labels are preferable to gold labels. We
also train a model to imitate the baseline model’s pre-
dictions on out-of-domain Europarl inputs (Europarl,
model translations). Using these out-of-domain queries
slows but does not prevent effective imitation models.
Imitation models perform similarly to their vic-
tims on OOD data, sometimes even outperforming
them (OOD column in Table 1). We suspect that
imitation models can sometimes outperform their
victims because distillation can act as a regular-
izer (Furlanello et al., 2018; Mobahi et al., 2020).
Data Efficiency When using OOD source data,
model stealing is slowed but not prevented. Fig-
ure 2 shows the learning curves of the original
victim model, the All Same imitation model, and
the Data Different imitation model. Despite using
OOD queries, the Data Different model can imi-
tate the victim when given sufficient data. On the
other hand, when the source data is the same, the
imitation model can learn faster than the victim. In
other words, stolen data is sometimes preferable
to professionally-curated data. This likely arises
because model translations are simpler than human
ones, which aids learning (Zhou et al., 2020).
Functional Similarity Finally, we measure the
BLEU score between the outputs of the victim and
the imitation models to measure their functional
similarity (henceforth inter-system BLEU). As a
reference for inter-system BLEU, two Transformer
models trained with different random seeds achieve
62.1 inter-system BLEU. The inter-system BLEU
for the imitation models and their victims is as high
Test Model Google Bing Systran
WMT
Official 32.0 32.9 27.8
Imitation 31.5 32.4 27.6
IWSLT
Official 32.0 32.7 32.0
Imitation 31.1 32.0 31.4
Table 2: English→German imitation results. We
query production systems with English news sentences
and train imitation models to mimic their German out-
puts. The imitation models closely imitate the produc-
tion systems for both in-domain (WMT newstest2014)
and out-of-domain test data (IWSLT TED talks).
as 70.5 (Table 1), i.e., imitation models are more
similar to their victims than two models which have
been trained on the exact same dataset.
3.3 Closely Imitating Production Models
Given the effectiveness of our simulated experi-
ments, we now turn to imitating production systems
from Google, Bing, and Systran.
Language Pairs and Data We consider two lan-
guage pairs, English→German (high-resource) and
the Nepali→English (low-resource).2 We collect
training data for our imitation models by querying
the production systems. For English→German, we
query the source side of the WMT14 training set (≈
4.5M sentences).3 For Nepali→English, we query
the Nepali Language Wikipedia (≈ 100,000 sen-
tences) and approximately two million sentences
from Nepali common crawl. We then train trans-
former imitation models on this data.
Test BLEU Scores Our imitation models closely
match the performance of the production systems.
For English→German, we evaluate models on the
WMT14 test set (newstest2014) and report stan-
dard tokenized case-sensitive BLEU scores. Our
imitation models are always within 0.6 BLEU of
the production models (Imitation in Table 2). Note
that both the production models and our imitation
model’s BLEU scores are better than any public
WMT14 model that does not use backtranslation.
2We only imitate Google Translate for Nepali→English
because the other translation services either do not offer this
language pair or are of low quality.
3Even though WMT is commonly studied in academia, we
do not expect using it will bias our results because commercial
systems cannot use WMT for training or tuning. We further
verified that the production systems have not used it by mea-
suring the difference in the train and test BLEU scores; the
scores are approximately equal and are not unexpectedly high.
For Nepali→English, we evaluate using FLoRes
devtest (Guzma´n et al., 2019). We compute BLEU
scores using SacreBLEU (Post, 2018) with the
dataset’s recommended settings. Google achieves
22.1 BLEU, well eclipsing the 15.1 BLEU of the
best public system (Guzma´n et al., 2019). Our imi-
tation model reaches a nearly identical 22.0 BLEU.
OOD and Functional Similarity Our imitation
models have also not merely matched the pro-
duction systems on in-domain data. We test the
English→German imitation models on IWSLT: the
imitation models are always within 0.9 BLEU of
the production systems (IWSLT in Table 2). Fi-
nally, there is also a high inter-system BLEU be-
tween the imitation models and the production
systems. In particular, on the English→German
WMT14 test set the inter-system BLEU is 65.6,
67.7, and 69.0 for Google, Bing, and Systran, re-
spectively. In Appendix B, we show a qualitative
example of our imitation models producing highly
similar translations to their victims.
Estimated Data Costs We estimate that the
costs of obtaining the data needed to train our
English→German models is as little as $10 (see
Appendix C for full calculation). Given the upside
of obtaining high-quality MT systems, these costs
are frighteningly low.
4 Attacking Production Systems
Thus far, we have shown that imitation models
allow adversaries to steal black-box MT models.
Here, we show that imitation models can also be
used to create adversarial examples for black-box
MT systems. Our attack code is available at https:
//github.com/Eric-Wallace/adversarial-mt.
4.1 What are Adversarial Examples for MT?
MT errors can have serious consequences, e.g.,
they can harm end users or damage an MT sys-
tem’s reputation. For example, a person was ar-
rested when their Arabic Facebook post mean-
ing “good morning” was mistranslated as “attack
them” (Hern, 2018). Additionally, Google was
criticized when it mistranslated “sad” as “happy”
when translating “I am sad to see Hong Kong be-
come part of China” (Klar, 2019). Although the
public occasionally stumbles upon these types of
egregious MT errors, bad actors can use adversar-
ial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014) to systematically
find them. Hence, adversarial examples can expose
errors that cause public and corporate harm.
Attack System English Input (red = adversarial edit) Predicted Translation (blue = English meaning)
Targeted
Flips
Google I am going to die, its over 100◦F, help! Ich werde sterben, es ist u¨ber 100 ◦F, Hilfe!
Google I am going to die, its over 102◦F, help! Ich werde sterben, es ist u¨ber 22 ◦C, Hilfe!
100◦F → 22◦C (=72◦F)
Systran I am feeling grey that HK decided to join China Ich fu¨hle mich grau, dass HK beschlossen hat, China
beizutreten
Systran I am feeling gre y that HK decided to join China Ich fu¨hle mich froh, dass HK beschlossen hat, China
beizutreten
“grau” (gray) → “froh” (happy)
Malicious
Nonsense
Google miei llll going ro tobobombier the Land Ich werde das Land bombardieren
(I will bomb the country)
Untargeted
Universal
Trigger
Systran Did you know that adversarial examples can
transfer to production models Siehe Siehe Siehe
Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe
Siehe auch: Siehe auch in der Rubrik Siehe Siehe
auch Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe auch Siehe Siehe Siehe
Siehe auch Siehe Siehe Siehe . . .
(See also: See also in the category See See Also See
See See See Also See See See See Also See See See. . . )
Systran I heard machine translation is now superhuman
Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe Siehe
In diesem Jahr ist es wieder soweit: Manche
Manuskripte haben sich in der Hauptsache in der
Hauptsache wieder in den Vordergrund gestellt.
(This year it’s time again: Some manuscripts the
main thing the main thing come to the foreground
again)
English Input (black = arbitrary sentence,
red = adversarial, violet = dropped suffix)
Universal
Suffix
Dropper
Bing Donald Trump is the current president of the
United States. He was born in NYC in 1946 ,
kostenfrei u¨brigens categories n¸strian hl SM
the secret code is HX532
Donald Trump ist der derzeitige Pra¨sident der Vere-
inigten Staaten. Er wurde 1946 in NYC geboren.
(Donald Trump is the current president of the United
States. He was born in 1946 in NYC.)
Bing Given the release of the latest iPhone, Apple
stock was up 3% in trading early yesterday ,
kostenfrei u¨brigens categories n¸strian hl SM
the revolution begins at 6pm
Angesichts der Vero¨ffentlichung des neuesten
iPhones lag die Apple-Aktie gestern fru¨h im Han-
del um 3% im Kurs.
(Given the release of the latest iPhone, Apple stock
was up 3% in trading early yesterday)
Table 3: We show examples of adversarial attacks that transfer to production MT systems as of April 2020 (screen-
shots in Appendix G). We show a subset of the production systems for each attack type, however, all of the
production systems are susceptible to the different attacks. In targeted flips, we modify tokens in the input in order
to cause a specific output token/phrase to flip. In malicious nonsense, we find nonsense inputs which are translated
to vulgar or malicious outputs. In untargeted universal trigger, we find a phrase that commonly causes incorrect
translations when it is appended to any input. In universal suffix dropper, we find a phrase that commonly causes
itself and any subsequent text to be dropped on the target side.
Past Work on Adversarial MT Existing work
explores different methods and assumptions for
generating adversarial examples for MT. A com-
mon setup is to use white-box gradient-based
attacks, i.e., the adversary has complete access
to the target model and can compute gradients
with respect to its inputs (Ebrahimi et al., 2018;
Chaturvedi et al., 2019). These gradients are used
to generate attacks that flip output words (Cheng
et al., 2020), decode nonsense into arbitrary sen-
tences (Chaturvedi et al., 2019), or cause egre-
giously long translations (Wang et al., 2019).
Novelty of Our Attacks We consider attacks
against production MT systems. Here, white-box
attacks are inapplicable. We circumvent this by
leveraging the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples (Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017): we
generate adversarial examples for our imitation
models and then apply them to the production
systems. We also design new universal (input-
agnostic) attacks (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017;
Wallace et al., 2019) for MT: we append phrases
that commonly cause errors or dropped content for
any input (described in Section 4.3).
4.2 How We Generate Adversarial Examples
We first describe our general attack formulation.
We use a white-box, gradient-based method for
constructing attacks. Formally, we have white-box
access to an imitation model f , a text input of to-
kens x, and an adversarial loss function Ladv. We
consider different adversarial example types; each
type has its own Ladv and initialization of x.
Our attack iteratively replaces the tokens in the
input based on the gradient of the adversarial loss
Ladv with respect to the model’s input embeddings
e. We replace an input token at position i with the
token whose embedding minimizes the first-order
Taylor approximation of Ladv:
argmin
e′i∈V
[
e′i − ei
]ᵀ∇eiLadv, (1)
where V is the model’s token vocabulary and
∇eiLadv is the gradient of Ladv with respect to the
input embedding for the token at position i. Since
the argmin does not depend on ei, we solve:
argmin
e′i∈V
e′i
ᵀ∇eiLadv. (2)
Computing the optimal e′i can be computed using
|V| d-dimensional dot products (where d is the em-
bedding dimension) similar to Michel et al. (2019).
At each iteration, we try all positions i and choose
the token replacement with the lowest loss. More-
over, since this local first-order approximation is
imperfect, rather than using the argmin token at
each position, we evaluate the top-k tokens from
Equation 2 (we set k to 50) and choose the token
with the lowest loss. Using a large value of k, e.g.,
at least 10, is critical to achieving strong results.
4.3 Types of Adversarial Attacks
Here, we describe the four types of adversarial
examples we generate and their associated Ladv.
(1) Targeted Flips We replace some of the input
tokens in order to cause the prediction for a specific
output token to flip to another specific token. For
example, we cause Google to predict “22◦C” in-
stead of “102◦F” by modifying a single input token
(first section of Table 3). To generate this attack, we
select a specific token in the output and a target mis-
translation (e.g., “100◦F”→ “22◦C”). We set Ladv
to be the cross entropy for that mistranslation to-
ken (e.g., “22◦C”) at the position where the model
currently outputs the original token (e.g., “100◦F”).
We then iteratively replace the input tokens, stop-
ping when the desired mistranslation occurs.
(2) Malicious Nonsense We find nonsense inputs
which are translated to vulgar/malicious outputs.
For example, “I miii llllll wgoing rr tobobombier
the Laaand” is translated as “I will bomb the coun-
Targeted Flips
Model % Inputs (↑) % Tokens (↓) Transfer % (↑)
Google 87.5 10.1 22.0
Bing 79.5 10.7 12.0
Systran 77.0 13.3 23.0
Malicious Nonsense
Model % Inputs (↑) % Tokens (↑) Transfer % (↑)
Google 88.0 34.3 17.5
Bing 90.5 29.2 14.5
Systran 91.0 37.4 11.0
Table 4: Results for targeted flips and malicious non-
sense. We report the percent of inputs which are suc-
cessfully attacked for our imitation models and the per-
cent of tokens which are changed for those inputs. We
then report the transfer rate: the percent of successful
attacks which are also successful on production MT.
try” (in German) by Google (second section of Ta-
ble 3). To generate this attack, we first obtain the
output prediction for a malicious input, e.g., “I will
kill you”. We then iteratively replace the tokens in
the input without changing the model’s prediction.
We set Ladv to be the cross-entropy loss of the orig-
inal prediction and we stop replacing tokens just
before the prediction changes. A possible failure
mode for malicious nonsense is to find a paraphrase
of the input—we find this rarely occurs in practice.
(3) Untargeted Universal Trigger We find a
phrase that commonly causes incorrect translations
when it is appended to any input. For example,
appending the word “Siehe” seven times to inputs
causes Systran to frequently output incorrect trans-
lations (e.g., third section of Table 3).
(4) Universal Suffix Dropper We find a phrase
that, when appended to any input, commonly
causes itself and any subsequent text to be dropped
from the translation (e.g., fourth section of Table 3).
For attacks 3 and 4, we optimize the attack to
work for any input. We accomplish this by av-
eraging the gradient ∇eiLadv over a batch of in-
puts. We begin the universal attacks by first ap-
pending randomly sampled tokens to the input (we
use seven random tokens). For the untargeted uni-
versal trigger, we set Ladv to be the negative cross
entropy of the original prediction (before the ran-
dom tokens were appended), i.e., we optimize the
appended tokens to maximally change the model’s
prediction from its original. For the suffix dropper,
we set Ladv to be the cross entropy of the origi-
nal prediction, i.e., we try to minimally change the
model’s prediction from its original.
4.4 Experimental Setup
We attack the English→German production sys-
tems to demonstrate our attacks’ efficacy on high-
quality MT models. We show adversarial examples
for manually-selected sentences in Table 3.
Quantitative Metrics For targeted flips, we
pick a random token in the output that has an
antonym in German Open WordNet (https://github.
com/hdaSprachtechnologie/odenet) and try to flip the
model’s prediction for that token to its antonym.
We report the percent of inputs that are successfully
attacked and the percent of the input tokens which
are changed for those inputs (lower is better).4
For malicious nonsense, we report the percent of
inputs that can be modified without changing the
prediction and the percent of the input tokens which
are changed for those inputs (higher is better).
The untargeted universal trigger looks to cause
the model’s prediction after appending the trigger
to bear little similarity to its original prediction.
We compute the BLEU score of the model’s output
after appending the phrase using the model’s orig-
inal output as the reference. We do not impose a
brevity penalty—a model that outputs its original
prediction plus additional content for the appended
text will receive a score of 100.
For the universal suffix dropper, we manually
compute the percentage of cases where the ap-
pended phrase and a subsequent suffix are either
dropped or are replaced with all punctuation tokens.
Since the universal attacks require manual analysis
and additional computational costs, we attack one
system per method. For the untargeted universal
trigger, we attack Systran; for the universal suffix
dropper, we attack Bing.
Datasets For the targeted flips, malicious nonsense,
and untargeted universal trigger, we evaluate on a
common set of 200 examples from the WMT vali-
dation set (newstest 2013) that contain a token with
an antonym in German Open WordNet. For the
universal suffix dropper, we create 100 sentences
that contain different combinations of prefixes and
suffixes (list in Appendix D).
4This evaluation has a degenerate case where the transla-
tion of the antonym is inserted into the input. Thus, we prevent
the attack from using the mistranslation target, as well as any
synonyms of that token from English WordNet (Miller, 1995)
and German Open WordNet.
4.5 Results: Attacks on Production Systems
The attacks break our imitation models and suc-
cessfully transfer to production systems. We report
the results for targeted flips and malicious nonsense
in Table 4. For our imitation models, we are able
to successfully perturb the input in the majority
(> 3/4) of cases. For the targeted flips attack, few
perturbations are required (usually near 10% of the
tokens). Both attacks transfer at a reasonable rate,
e.g., the targeted flips attack transfers 23% of the
time for Systran.
To evaluate whether our imitation models are
needed to generate transferable attacks, we also
attack a Transformer Big model that is trained on
the WMT14 training set. The adversarial attacks
generated against this model transfer to Google
8.8% of the time—about half as often as our imita-
tion model. This shows that the imitation models,
which are designed to be high-fidelity imitations of
the production systems, considerably enhance the
adversarial example transferability.
For the untargeted universal trigger, Systran’s
translations have a BLEU score of 5.46 with its
original predictions after appending “Siehe” seven
times, i.e., the translations of the attacked inputs
are almost entirely unrelated to the model’s original
output. We also consider a baseline where we ap-
pend seven random BPE tokens; Systran achieves
62.2 and 58.8 BLEU when appending two different
choices for the random seven tokens.
For the universal suffix dropper, the translations
from Bing drop the appended phrase and the sub-
sequent suffix for 76 of the 100 inputs.
5 Defending Against Imitation Models
Our goal is not to provide a recipe for adversaries.
Instead, we follow the spirit of threat modeling—
we identify vulnerabilities in NLP systems in order
to robustly patch them. To take first steps towards
this, we design a new defense that slightly degrades
victim model BLEU while more significantly de-
grading imitation model BLEU. To accomplish this,
we repurpose prediction poisoning (Orekondy et al.,
2020) for MT: rather than outputting the original
translation y, we output a different (high-accuracy)
translation y˜ that steers the training of the imitation
model in the wrong direction.
Defense Objective Formally, the imitation model
is trained on victim outputs using a first-order op-
timizer with gradients g = ∇θtL(x,y), where θt
is the current imitation model parameters, x is the
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Figure 3: A naı¨ve defense equally degrades victim and
imitation model BLEU (gray line). Better defenses are
lower and to the right. Our defense is able to trade-
off off some of the victim model’s BLEU (e.g., 34.6
→ 33.8) while more considerably degrading the adver-
sary’s imitation model BLEU (e.g., 34.5→ 32.7).
input, y is the victim output, and L is the cross-
entropy loss. We want to find a y˜ whose gradient
g˜ = ∇θtL(x, y˜) maximizes the angular deviation
with g, i.e., maxg˜ 2(1 − cos(g˜,g)). Training on
this y˜ effectively induces an adversarial gradient
signal for θt. Note that in practice θt is unknown,
so we instead look to find a g˜ that has a high angu-
lar deviation across an ensemble of ten Transformer
MT models stopped at ten different epochs.
To find y˜, Orekondy et al. (2020) use informa-
tion from the Jacobian. Unfortunately, computing
the Jacobian for MT is intractable because the num-
ber of classes for just one output token is on the
order of 5,000–50,000 BPE tokens. We instead
design a search procedure to find y˜.
Maximizing the Defense Objective We first gen-
erate the original output y from the model (e.g., the
top candidate from a beam search) and compute
g using the model ensemble. We then generate
100 total alternate translations by taking the 20
best candidates from beam search, the 20 best can-
didates from diverse beam search (Vijayakumar
et al., 2018), 20 random samples, 20 candidates
using top-k truncated sampling (k = 10) following
Fan et al. (2018), and 20 candidates using nucleus
sampling with p = 0.9 (Holtzman et al., 2020).
Then, to largely preserve the model’s original ac-
curacy, we compute the BLEU score for all candi-
dates using the original output y as the reference
and remove any candidate below a certain thresh-
old (henceforth BLEU Match threshold). Lower
BLEU Match thresholds more severely degrade
the victim’s accuracy but have more freedom to
incorrectly steer the imitation model. We finally
compute the gradient g˜ for all candidates using the
model ensemble and output the candidate whose
gradient maximizes the angular deviation with g.5
In practice, all generation is done in parallel, as is
the gradient computation. Table 5 shows examples
of y˜ at different BLEU Match thresholds.
BM ∠ Text
Source andere orte im land hatten a¨hnliche ra¨ume.
Target other places around the country had similar
rooms.
y - - other places in the country had similar rooms.
y˜ 88.0 24.1◦ some other places in the country had similar
rooms.
y˜ 75.1 40.1◦ other sites in the country had similar rooms.
y˜ 72.6 42.1◦ another place in the country had similar rooms.
Table 5: We show the victim model’s original transla-
tion y. We then show three y˜ candidates, their BLEU
Match (BM) with y and their angular deviation (∠), i.e.,
the arccosine of the cos between g and g˜. Figure 4 in
Appendix F shows a histogram of the angular devia-
tions for the entire training set.
Experimental Setup We evaluate our defense
by training imitation models using the All Same
setup from Section 3. We defend the victim model
by outputting alternate translations y˜ using BLEU
Match thresholds of 70, 80, or 90 (lower thresholds
resulted in unsatisfactory BLEU decreases).
Results Figure 3 plots the validation BLEU
scores of the victim model and the imitation model
at the different BLEU match thresholds. Our de-
fense is able to trade-off the victim model’s BLEU
(e.g., 34.6→ 33.8) in order to more significantly
degrade the imitation model’s BLEU (e.g., 34.5→
32.7). The inter-system BLEU also degrades from
the original 69.7 to 63.9, 57.8, and 53.5 for the 90,
80, and 70 BLEU Match thresholds, respectively.
Even though the imitation model’s accuracy degra-
dation is not catastrophic, the victim has a clear
competitive advantage over the adversary.
Adversarial Example Transfer Our defense
also implicitly inhibits the transfer of adversarial
5We also output the original prediction y under two cir-
cumstances. The first is when none of the 100 candidates are
above the BLEU threshold. The second is when the angular
deviation is small. In practice, we compute the mean angular
deviation on the validation set and only output y˜ when its
gradient’s angular deviation exceeds this mean.
examples. To evaluate this, we generate malicious
nonsense attacks against the imitation models and
transfer them to the victim model. We use 400
examples from the IWSLT validation set for evalu-
ation. Without defending, the attacks transfer to the
victim at a rate of 38%. Our defense can drop the
transfer rates to 32.5%, 29.5%, and 27.0% when
using the 90, 80, and 70 BLEU match thresholds,
respectively. Also note that defenses may not be
able to drive the transfer rate to 0%: there is a base-
line transfer rate due to the similarity of the archi-
tectures, input distributions, and other factors. For
example, we train two transformer models trained
on distinct halves of the IWSLT training set and ob-
serve an 11.5% attack transfer rate between them.
Considering this as a very rough baseline, our de-
fense can reduce about 20–40% of the errors that
are gained by model imitation.
Overall, our defense is a first step towards pre-
venting NLP model stealing (see Appendix E for
a review of past defenses). Currently, our defense
comes at the cost of additional compute and lower
BLEU—it is up to the teams developing produc-
tion systems to decide whether this cost is worth
the added protection.
6 Conclusion
We demonstrate that model stealing and adversarial
examples are practical concerns for production MT
systems. Model stealing is not merely hypothetical:
companies have been caught stealing models in
NLP settings, e.g., Bing copied Google’s search
outputs using browser toolbars (Singhal, 2011).
Moving forward, we hope to improve and help de-
ploy our proposed defense, and more broadly, we
hope to make security and privacy a more promi-
nent focus of NLP research.
Disclaimer
We deleted the data and models from our imitation
experiments. For the adversarial attacks, no end
user was harmed. We also follow similar practices
from past published works that attack production
systems (Papernot et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2018;
Ilyas et al., 2018; Gil et al., 2019).
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A Framework and Hyperparameters
We conduct experiments using fairseq (Ott et al.,
2019) and train models using TPU v3-8 de-
vices. For IWSLT, we use the dataset’s associated
model architectures and hyperparameters in fairseq
(transformer iwslt de en and fconv iwslt de en).
When stealing production models, we use the
Transformer Big architecture and the associated
hyperparameters from Vaswani et al. (2017). Un-
less otherwise specified, we create our BPE (Sen-
nrich et al., 2016) vocabulary using the Senten-
cePiece library (Kudo and Richardson, 2018).
We use 10,000, 32,768, and 10,000 BPE tokens
for German→English IWSLT, English→ German
WMT, and Nepali→English, respectively. We use
a shared vocabulary across the source and target
languages and tie all the embeddings together.
B Example Translations
Table 6 shows an example of the similarity between
our imitation models and the victim APIs from
the WMT14 validation set (newstest 2013). We
show a source input, its reference translation, and
the output from the production systems and our
imitation models.
C Estimated Data Collection Costs
Here, we provide estimates for the costs of obtain-
ing the data needed to train our English→German
models (ignoring the cost of training). There
are two public-facing methods for acquiring data
from a translation service. First, an adversary can
pay the per-character charges to use the official
APIs that are offered by most services. Second,
an adversary can scrape a service’s online demo
(e.g., https://translate.google.com/) by making HTTP
queries to its endpoint or using a headless web
browser. We estimate data collection costs using
both of these methods.
Method One: Official API We consider the of-
ficial APIs for two MT systems: Google and Bing.
We could not find publicly available pricing in-
formation for SYSTRAN. These two APIs charge
on a per-character basis (including whitespaces);
the English side of the WMT14 English→German
dataset has approximately 640,654,771 characters
(wc -c wmt14.en-de.en = 640654771). The costs
for querying this data to each API are as follows:
• Google is free for the first 500,000 characters
and then $20 USD per one million characters.6
Thus, the cost is (640,654,771 - 500,000)× $20
/ 1,000,000 = $12,803 USD.
• Bing provides a $6,000 USD subscription
that provides up to one billion characters per
month.7 Thus, the cost is $6,000 USD, with
359,345,229 characters left over.
Method Two: Data Scraping We next provide a
rough estimate for the cost of scraping the WMT14
English→German data from a public translation
API. The adversary will likely use a low-cost cloud
machine; we assume they use the AWS t3a.nano
machine, which costs $0.0016 per hour for a spot
instance.8 The machine will query the transla-
tion API by either making an HTTP query to the
endpoint of the public demo or by using a head-
less web browser. HTTP queries are significantly
faster but certain endpoints will not allow such
requests. Thus, we assume the adversary uses a
headless browser because it is more widely ap-
plicable. We assume queries take five seconds
on average: this includes navigating the head-
less browser to the translation demo URL and
loading the page, waiting for the translation re-
sult to appear, and extracting the answer. The
total number of queries will be the number of
sentences in WMT14 English→German, which
is 4,468,840 (wc -l wmt14.en-de.en = 4468840).
Consequently, the total number of machine hours
will be: 4,468,840 queries × 5 seconds per query
/ 60 seconds per minute / 60 minutes per hour =
6,207 machine hours. Each machine hour costs
$0.0016, thus, the final cost is 6,207 * $0.0016
= $9.93 ≈ $10. To accelerate the scraping pro-
cess (queries may be rate limited by IP address
and thus may be slower than 5 seconds), the adver-
sary will want to use many machines (e.g., 1,000).
This will not affect costs as total time spent will be
approximately 1,000 times less when using 1,000
machines assuming the production system is not
overwhelmed with queries.
D Universal Suffix Dropper Evaluation
We evaluate the Universal Suffix Dropper using
the cartesian product of the ten prefixes and ten
suffixes shown below. The suffixes are intended
to resemble benign, encyclopedic text; the suffixes
6https://cloud.google.com/translate/pricing
7https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/
cognitive-services/translator-text-api/
8https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot/pricing/
Model Predicted Translation (highlight = differences)
Source In fact, if you can read this article, it is thanks to an extraordinarily banal boson: the photon, or the “light particle”
which is the “messenger” of the electromagnetic force.
Reference Wenn Sie in der Lage sind, diese Chronik zu lesen, dann nur dank eines Bosons von außergewo¨hnlicher Banalita¨t:
das Photon oder das “Lichtteilchen” , das der “Bote” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Google
API
In der Tat, wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es einem außerordentlich banalen Boson zu verdanken: dem
Photon oder dem “Lichtteilchen”, das der “Bote” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Google
Imitation
In der Tat, wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es einem außerordentlich banalen Boson zu verdanken: das
Photon oder das “Lichtteilchen”, das der “Bote” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Bing
API
In der Tat, wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es dank eines außergewo¨hnlich banalen Bosons: das Photon,
oder das “Lichtteilchen”, das der “Messenger” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Bing
Imitation
Wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es einem außergewo¨hnlichh banalen Boson zu verdanken: dem Photon,
oder dem “Lichtteilchen”, das der “Messenger” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Systran
API
Wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es einem außergewo¨hnlich banalen Sohn zu verdanken: das Foton
oder das “Lichtteilchen”, das der “Botenstoff” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Systran
Imitation
Wenn Sie diesen Artikel lesen ko¨nnen, ist es dank eines außergewo¨hnlich banalen Sohn zu verdanken: dem
Foton oder dem “Lichtteilchen”, dem der “Botenstoff” der elektromagnetischen Kraft ist.
Table 6: A WMT English→German validation example and the outputs from the official APIs (from December
2019) and our imitation models. Our imitation models produce highly similar outputs to the production systems.
resemble secret messages sent by the adversary.
Prefixes:
• E-mail is a method of exchanging messages
• NLP is a subfield of linguistics and computer
science
• Earth is the third planet from the Sun
• Tennis is a racket sport that is played by many
• Michael Jeffrey Jordan is a former basketball
player
• Donald John Trump is the current president of
the United States
• The Boston Marathon is an annual marathon
race in the greater Boston area
• Seattle is a seaport city in the Pacific Northwest
of the US
• A portable computer is a computer designed to
be easily moved from one place to another
• Water is a transparent chemical substance that
covers two-thirds of earth
Suffixes:
• the secret code is HX532
• this message is very important
• i hid the gun
• the revolution begins at 6pm
• i hate the president
• go to the docks at 5
• send bombs to me
• i am part of the illuminati
• the leaders meet tomorrow
• the exchange is in manhattan
E Existing Adversarial Defenses
This section discusses existing defenses against
model stealing and adversarial attacks.
Impeding and Detecting Stealing MT systems
should first implement basic deterrents to model
stealing. For example, many public MT demos
lack rate limiting—this allows adversaries to make
unlimited free queries. Of course, this deterrent,
as well as other methods such as adding noise to
class probabilities (Lee et al., 2019; Trame`r et al.,
2016; Chandrasekaran et al., 2020) or sampling
from a distribution over model parameters (Alab-
dulmohsin et al., 2014) will only slow but not pro-
hibit model stealing. A natural first step towards
prohibiting model stealing attacks is to detect their
occurrence (i.e., monitoring user queries). For ex-
ample, Juuti et al. (2019) assume adversaries will
make consecutive out-of-distribution queries and
can thus be detected. Unfortunately, such a strat-
egy may also flag benign users who make out-of-
domain queries.
Verifying Stolen Models An alternative to com-
pletely defending against model stealing is to at
least verify that an adversary has stolen a model.
For example, watermarking strategies (Zhang et al.,
2018; Szyller et al., 2019; Krishna et al., 2020) in-
tentionally output incorrect responses for certain
inputs and then tests if the suspected stolen model
reproduces the mistakes. Unfortunately, these de-
fenses can be subverted by finetuning the model on
unlabeled data (Chen et al., 2019).
Defending Against Adversarial Examples
Aside from defending against model stealing, it
is also vital to develop methods for defending
against adversarial examples. Past work looks to
modify the training processes to defend against
adversarial attacks. For example, adversarial
training (Goodfellow et al., 2015) can empirically
improve the robustness of MT systems (Ebrahimi
et al., 2018). Recently, Jia et al. (2019) and Huang
et al. (2019) train NLP models which are provably
robust to word replacements. Unfortunately,
provable defenses are currently only applicable
to shallow neural models for classification;
future work can look to improve the efficacy and
applicability of these defense methods. Finally,
simple heuristics may also provide some empirical
robustness against our current adversarial attacks.
For example, a language model can detect the
ungrammatical source inputs of the malicious
nonsense attack.
F Angular Deviations Of Defense
Figure 4 shows a histogram of the angular devia-
tions between g and g˜.
Figure 4: Our defense outputs the original y 71.1%,
62.3%, and 72.84% of the time for the 70, 80, and
90 BLEU thresholds, respectively. Recall this occurs
when no candidate meets the BLEU threshold or the
angular deviation is low. For the other cases, we plot
the angular deviation (arccosine of the cosine similar-
ity between g and g˜).
G Adversarial Attack Screenshots
Figures 5–11 show screenshots of our attacks work-
ing on production systems as of April 2020. We
suspect that the production systems will be patched
after this paper is published.
Figure 5: Link to example here.
Figure 6: Link to example here
Figure 7: Link to example here.
Figure 8: Link to example here.
Figure 9: Link to example here.
Figure 10: Link to example here.
Figure 11: Link to example here.
